Pablo Garriga
Gabriel Ulyssea
Costas Meghir
Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg
Rafael Dix-Carneiro
Alessandro Toppeta
Áureo de Paula
Orazio Attanasio
Seth Zimmerman
Joseph Price
Valerie Michelman
Camille Semelet
Anne Brockmeyer
Pierre Bachas
Santiago Pérez
Elisa Jácome
Leah Boustan
Ran Abramitzky
Jesse Rothstein
Jeffrey T. Denning
Sandra Black
Wei Cui
Mathieu Leduc
Philippe Jehiel
Shivam Gujral
Suraj Sridhar
Attila Lindner
Arindrajit Dube
Pascual Restrepo
Łukasz Rachel
Benjamin Moll
Kirill Borusyak
Michael McMahon
Frederic Malherbe
Gabor Pinter
Angus Foulis
Saleem Bahaj
Stone Centre
Phil Thornton
James Baggaley
Xavier Jaravel
Richard Blundell
Parama Chaudhury
Dani Rodrik
Alan Olivi
Vincent Sterk
Davide Melcangi
Enrico Miglino
Fabian Kosse
Daniel Wilhelm
Azeem M. Shaikh
Joseph Romano
Magne Mogstad
Suresh Naidu
Ilyana Kuziemko
Daniel Herbst
Henry Farber
Lisa Windsteiger
Ruben Durante
Mathias Dolls
Cevat Giray Aksoy
Angel Sánchez
Penélope Hernández
Antonio Cabrales
Wendy Carlin
Suphanit Piyapromdee
Garud Iyengar
Willemien Kets
Rajiv Sethi
Ralph Luetticke
Benjamin Born
Amy Bogaard
Mattia Fochesato
Samuel Bowles
Guanyi Wang
CORE
David Cai
Toru Kitagawa
Michela Tincani
Christian Bayer
Arun Advani
Elliott Ash
Imran Rasul

Home values and firm behaviour

What is this research about and why did you do it?

The link between housing and economic activity is often seen as working through consumers responding to house prices either as a result of wealth effects or because of changes in the availability of credit. However, for entrepreneurs and small business owners, housing is also an important source of collateral for business loans. Around half of business loans in the UK are secured against the entrepreneur’s personal assets; typically, the family home. This is true for both start-ups and ongoing businesses. The implications of changes in house prices for this sort of borrowing and for firm-level outcomes required exploration.

How did you answer this question?

In the UK, those in charge of a business (the directors) must register their usual residential address with Companies House.  We merge this data with information from the Land Registry on housing transactions to value directors’ properties, and with firm-level information on employment, balance sheets and income statements.  We explore the effect of a change in director housing wealth on firm behaviour using a suite of empirical approaches to control for other channels beyond those flowing from the value of the collateral.

What did you find?

We find that for every £1 increase in the value of directors’ homes, the average firm invests 3p more in fixed assets like machinery or its own buildings. For every £1.1 million increase (2005 prices) in home values the firm hires one more worker. Firms that exhibit signs of being financially constrained as well those that have directors who are more highly leveraged respond more to home values.  

These effects are concentrated in the lower portion of the firm size distribution (see figure). By weight of numbers, the directors of smaller firms own a disproportionate share of director housing wealth. Hence, an increase in house prices can have large aggregate effects through increasing the collateral available to firms. For the economy as a whole, our estimates translate to a 1% increase in house prices directly increasing aggregate investment by 0.28%. By way of comparison, aggregate house prices increased by around 80% over our 2002-2014 sample period.

Fixed investment response by firms to changes in directors' house values across the firm size distribution. The figure plots the response of fixed investment in £’s to a £1 increase in the home values of the firm’s directors. The blue diamond is the point estimate, with 95% confidence intervals also presented. The y-axis shows the coefficients for different firms based on the initial size of their balance sheet (x-axis). The percentages at the top of the figure are the shares of total director housing owned by the directors of firms in a particular size category – e.g., the directors of firms  with less than £1m in assets own 83.6% of the housing wealth owned by the directors of all firms combined.

What implications does this have for the research on wealth concentration or economic inequality?

The personal wealth of entrepreneurs is not equally distributed. Our research shows that the personal assets of entrepreneurs are an important determinant of whether a business, including on-going businesses, get the financing they need to grow. Increases in house prices can perpetuate wealth concentration and inequality by providing access to finance for investment for some firms and preventing relatively poor entrepreneurs without such collateral from seizing business opportunities.

What are the next steps in your agenda?

In follow up work (Bahaj, Foulis, Pinter and Surico, 2022, Journal of Monetary Economics) we explore the implications of housing collateral for business loans for the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we show that it can be used to be explain unequal firm-level responses to changes in interest rates. More work is also needed to understand the terms of the business loans secured against personal assets including whether lenders insist on the collateral to just obtain security or whether the collateral has an additional role as a screening/disciplining device.  

Citation and related resources

This paper can be cited as: Bahaj, S., Foulis, A. and Pinter, G. 2020. 'Home values and firm behavior'. American Economic Review, 110(7), pp: 2225-70.

Related resources:

About the authors

Saleem Bahaj

Associate Professor of Finance and Economics, UCL.

Saleem Bahaj
Angus Foulis

Economist, Bank of England.

Angus Foulis
Gabor Pinter

Senior Adviser, Bank of England.

Gabor Pinter
Size:
1
Mb

Related Content

expand icon

Research

expand icon

Education materials